We study the e¤ects of network externalities on a unique matching protocol for faculty in a large U.S. professional school to o¢ ces in a new building. We collected institutional, web, and survey data on faculty's attributes and choices. We …rst identify the di¤erent layers of the social network: institutional a¢ liation, coauthorships, and friendships. We demonstrate and quantify the e¤ects of network externalities on choices and outcomes. Furthermore, we disentangle the di¤erent layers of the social network and quantify their relative impact. Finally, we assess the matching protocol from a welfare perspective. Our study suggests the importance and feasibility of accounting for network externalities in general assignment problems and evaluates a set of techniques that can be employed to this end.
Introduction

Overview
Externalities are commonplace within assignment processes: In the housing market, the value of a property depends on the demographics of neighboring homeowners. In an oligopolistic market, the returns from joining one …rm depend on the composition of rivals. In universities, the desirability of a speci…c dorm room may depend on the peers in nearby rooms. In politics, the bene…t from joining a particular party or coalition varies with the other political alliances formed. In team sports, the value in joining one team depends on the quality of other teams' players. And so on and so forth. Despite the wide range of applications featuring externalities, the matching literature, both positive and prescriptive, has largely ignored their presence.
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One of the signi…cant challenges in assessing the role of externalities is that the underlying networks generating them are often unobservable or di¢ cult to pin down. In particular, while attributes such as income, professional quali…cation, and education are frequently available, other important measurements of social connection-friendship, a shared professional history, etc.-are more di¢ cult to obtain. Beyond the scarcity of data, the matching literature lacks a de…nitive framework that accounts for externalities, while still enabling empirical evaluations.
The current paper uses unique …eld data from a centralized assignment process in which connections between individuals were mapped at both the professional and social level. Specifically, our data originate from a matching process that assigned faculty members from a U.S. professional school to newly renovated o¢ ces. Using web and survey sources, we identify the institutional, coauthorship, and friendship networks of associations between the faculty involved.
Our study has three goals: First, to provide an empirical account of the e¤ects of externalities resulting from agents'connections on behavior and outcomes. Second, to assess the di¤ering networks'relative e¤ects. Third, to evaluate the e¢ ciency of matching protocols in terms of welfare, accounting for the identi…ed externalities. As a by-product, our analysis sug-1 For several exceptions, see the literature review below.
gests and appraises several econometric techniques for estimating network externalities, and, in particular, assessing the relative importance of the di¤erent layers of agents 'interactions. 2 Our data describe the matching process and …nal assignment of 73 faculty into o¢ ces. The o¢ ces vary in their physical attributes-in particular, elevation, geographical exposure, and size, as well as their position and spatial relation to other o¢ ces. School o¢ cials designed a random serial-dictatorship matching protocol in which faculty members were coarsely ranked into three tiers according to career seniority, those with the greatest seniority choosing …rst; the order of choice was then randomized within each seniority level. Based on their rank number, each faculty member was called upon to select an o¢ ce from those remaining, observing each of the selections made before them. After the selection process was completed, faculty were free to trade o¢ ces, and, additionally, were permitted to use transfers from their research budgets to facilitate trades.
In this environment, the externalities across agents can be easily mapped and separated into three layers of a social network. The …rst is institutional: the faculty members are divided into departments, and, within each department, specialization …elds yield a further division into research clusters. The second social network is mapped using the past and current coauthorship links between faculty members. This network provides an alternative map of professional proximity, in which links between individuals were not incumbent on institutional a¢ liation or choice of research interest, but allowed to arise spontaneously across di¤erent clusters and departments through a bilateral choice. Finally, making use of a survey, we map a third social network, the social interactions and friendships between faculty members.
Our analysis follows several stages. As a preliminary step, we estimate an array of discretechoice models in which, at each decision node, a particular faculty member faces a choice from a menu of o¢ ces, and makes their decision based on each o¢ ce's physical attributes, as well as the network characteristics at the time of choice (for example, the number of coauthors who have located nearby). If network e¤ects play no role in choice, the corresponding network elements in our model should have no weight. However, all of our speci…cations generate signi…cant network e¤ects-in fact, the estimates suggest that network e¤ects have a comparable impact to those of physical attributes. Nonetheless, this approach is tantamount to assuming that faculty are myopic, ignoring the implications of their choices on their peers'impending selections. In that respect, while we can reject the hypothesis that networks have no impact on choice, the magnitude of these e¤ects should be interpreted carefully. This leads us to inspect more closely the dynamic and strategic aspects of the matching process.
In order to quantify the magnitudes of network sorting e¤ects, while accounting for the strategic aspects present during the matching process, we compare the empirical assignment to a counterfactual in which faculty choose o¢ ces based only on physical attributes. Using the order in which faculty made decisions, we examine the outcomes that would have occurred had faculty made choices purely on the basis of o¢ ces'physical characteristics-for instance, preferring o¢ ces on higher ‡oors to lower ones, large corner o¢ ces to all others, or westernexposure o¢ ces within a ‡oor to eastern ones. Where faculty face a choice from a subset of o¢ ces with the same physical characteristics, we assume the particular o¢ ce is chosen randomly from the subset. This allows us to simulate the resulting network clustering (for several preference speci…cations over o¢ ces'physical attributes) and compare it to that observed in the data. 3 The results from this comparison suggest that o¢ ce proximity (both at the ‡oor and o¢ ce-neighbor level) among linked individuals occurs signi…cantly more frequently in the observed assignment than in the simulated ones. Speci…cally, in the simulated assignments, members of the same department, coauthors, and friends are on the same ‡oor 16%, 28%, and 17% less often than in our data, respectively. Similarly, proximity of o¢ ce neighbors from every network layer were lower by 30% to 60%. From a general perspective, these results are illustrative (in both signi…cance and magnitude) of the potential importance of network externalities on assignment outcomes.
Next, we disentangle the relative importance of each of the three network layers. In particular, we are interested in separating the e¤ects of the institutional network, generated by department a¢ liation, from the idiosyncratic choice networks, described by coauthorships and friendships.
As mentioned before, following the sequential choice process, faculty were allowed to exchange their allocated o¢ ces using transfers between their research budgets. This allows us to de…ne a simple notion of stability pertaining to the …nal assignment (after all swaps were carried out). We say that an assignment is pairwise stable with transfers if there is no switch in o¢ ce assignments between two faculty members that results, with a transfer, in an improvement for both faculty, keeping all other o¢ ce assignments …xed. We show that pairwise-stable assignments exist when utilities are such that: (i) the e¤ects of o¢ ces'physical attributes are common across faculty and separable from network e¤ects; and (ii) network e¤ects are consistent in sign (for example, all positive) and separably additive (for example, utilities depend linearly on the number of peers that are within the relevant neighborhood).
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Pairwise stability (with transfers) imposes a sequence of constraints corresponding to all faculty pairs in our data. Using techniques developed recently for matching games without externalities (Bajari and Fox, 2009, and Fox, 2009 ), we estimate utility parameters for each of our network layers. We …nd that the coauthorship network has a greater impact than the institutional network, which is followed by the friendship network, which we …nd to have a negligible e¤ect. Beyond the relevance to the matching process per se, this observation highlights the importance of studying the appropriate network of connections when examining peer e¤ects. From a methodological point of view, these estimations underscore the importance of accounting for strategic behavior in dynamic matching markets. Indeed, the relative magnitudes of our estimates are di¤erent than those we achieve using standard discrete-choice models, which, as stressed above, omit the forward-looking strategic aspects.
Given the signi…cance of externalities in individuals' utilities, it is interesting to contemplate the design of high-welfare assignments. In principle, designing the most e¢ cient assignment is a complex problem due to the vast number (73! > 10 105 in our data set) of possible assignments. 5 As it turns out, designing the most e¢ cient assignment for a class of preferences taking into account network externalities (that encompasses those we estimate) is a special case of quadratic assignment problems (see Koopmans and Beckman, 1957) . While generally di¢ cult computationally, and subject of an active line of investigation in operation research, we show how new techniques, still unexploited in the economics literature, can be used to estimate upper and lower bounds on the e¢ ciency of the optimal assignment.
Under our assumptions that the e¤ects of o¢ ces' physical attributes are shared across faculty and are separable from network characteristics, utilitarian e¢ ciency is in ‡uenced only through the network e¤ects present in our population. In fact, given our utility speci…cation and the estimation results, any assignment that would increase the clustering of members from the di¤erent network layers would increase e¢ ciency. Using our estimates of the relative weights di¤erent network variables carry in faculty's preferences, we can evaluate the e¢ ciency of the matching protocol at hand. We assess a lower bound on the welfare loss generated by the outcome of the …eld experiment by identifying an assignment that achieves a 181% improvement over it. From a general institutional-design point of view, this analysis suggests the importance of recognizing and accounting for the underlying networks of relevant connections when constructing assignment mechanisms, and illustrates a computational technique for doing so in practice.
Related Literature
The idea that externalities may play a crucial role in group formation appears in some of the recent theoretical work on cooperative games. The general setup of games that are often referred to as "partition function games" (Lucas and Thrall, 1963, and Myerson, 1977) or "global games" (Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991) presumes that players' payo¤s depend on the partition of the population. There are two general approaches that the literature takes. One strand focuses on core-like or Shapley value notions in which a particular belief structure (pertaining to the entire population's reaction to a coalitional deviation) is imposed (for example, Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991 , De Clippel and Serrano, 2008 , and Hafalir, 2008 . The goal of this literature is to provide conditions under which the relevant solution concept exists. The other line of work is more explicitly dynamic in that it proposes a particular "bargaining protocol"
by which coalitions are formed and analyzes the resulting set of equilibria in terms of e¢ ciency and the pattern of emerging coalitions (see Bloch, 1996 , Maskin, 2003 , Ray and Vohra, 1999 , and Yi, 1997 .
In the context of matching, Sasaki and Toda (1996) illustrate the large freedom in beliefs regarding deviations from any market match that assure the existence of stable matches for any prevailing preferences.
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Without externalities, there is a large body of theoretical work that studies housing matching environments similar to ours (starting from Shapley and Scarf, 1974 and more recently explored in, for example, Che and Gale, 2009 , Ehlers, 2002 , Pycia and Ünver, 2007 references therein).
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Empirically, while we are not aware of any studies quantifying the e¤ects of network externalities in cooperative setups (matching environments in particular), the idea that peers may a¤ect behavior and outcomes has been explored in many realms (see, for instance, Jackson, 2008 and Wasserman and Faust, 1994 for references). 8 Also, there is a recent literature on …eld performance of assignment mechanism, which does not account for externalities (see Abdulkadiro¼ glu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez, 2006 , and references therein).
Methodologically, the dartboard approach used in Section 4 to estimate the impact of network externalities on the observed huddling of connected faculty has been used in other empirical studies on geographical clustering (for instance, Ellison and Glaeser, 1997 , who use a similar approach to estimate geographic concentration of U.S. manufacturing industries).
The estimations we perform in order to assess the relative magnitudes of the e¤ects of the di¤erent layers of the underlying networks utilize identi…cation techniques developed by Bajari and Fox (2009) and Fox (2009) .
Finally, our welfare analysis involves …nding the optimal solution for a quadratic assignment problem, which dates back to the speci…cation of location assignments with externalities in Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) . Solving this problem, which has been shown to be NP-hard, is a continuing area of research within the operations-research and combinatorics literatures.
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Several recent papers contain welfare assessments of assignments via random serialdictatorship, without externalities. Manea (2007) characterizes subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of serial-dictatorship procedures for multiple objects, and …nds that outcomes are not generically e¢ cient, in contrast to the single-object case. Budish and Cantillon (2009) analyze data from a university's course-assignment process and …nd that the university's manipulable mechanism provides ex-ante welfare improvement over the strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient random serial dictatorship.
Another assignment mechanism extensively studied in the literature is auctions. Bajari and Fox (2009) analyze the welfare loss in the sale of FCC spectrum licenses via auctions after constructing estimates of license complementarities. Again, externalities across di¤erent bidders' license assignments are assumed not to be present. Sönmez and Ünver (2009) discuss the welfare losses caused through auction mechanisms with endowment of …at currency, demonstrating the failure of these markets over straightforward statements of ordinal preference. Krishna and Ünver (2008) empirically analyze the results from course assignments with bidding, …nding the auction mechanism inferior to a standard Gale-Shapley approach.
The Allocation Process
In this section, we describe the details of the matching protocol that was utilized in the …eld experiment, as well as the components of our data set.
The Matching Protocol
In 2006, plans to renovate one building of a large U.S. professional school were revealed to the faculty. The renovation would result in 74 vacant o¢ ces. Dean-level negotiations produced an initial list of 74 faculty members from 4 departments to occupy the new building.
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The assignment process used was a random serial-dictatorship procedure. As a …rst step, the school o¢ cials produced a coarse ranking of the 74 faculty members according to career seniority: priority was given …rst to chaired professors and department chairs, then full and associate professors, and, …nally, assistant professors. The ordering of faculty within each group was determined by a random draw administered by the dean's o¢ ce, under the supervision of department representatives.
Once the ranking was determined, the faculty members bound for the new building received a memo that provided the complete ordering, as well as instructions on how the process would evolve. These instructions indicated that all the o¢ ce choices were to be conducted in one day. Each faculty member was able to see all the choices made up to the time of his/her own choice. New faculty members and others who could not be present on the day of the draft were asked to …ll out a proxy form, and asked to give their proxy to someone else or provide a detailed list of their preferences so that a choice could be made on their behalf. 11 On the day of the o¢ ce selections, a list of the faculty choices was posted publicly.
Conversations and discussions among the faculty took place prior to the selections. Faculty members were encouraged to make pre-and post-draft exchanges (prior to the draft, exchanges of rank numbers, and after the draft exchanges of o¢ ces). Further, faculty were allowed to use funds from their research accounts to facilitate both types of exchange. Indeed, while no exante draft-number trades took place, ex-post trades involving 5 o¢ ces occurred immediately following the draft. We have detailed data regarding 73 of these faculty, which are the subject of our study.
The Assignment Data
We collected three types of data: data on o¢ ce characteristics, population characteristics, and the matching process, which we now describe in turn.
O¢ ce Characteristics
The building had housed one of the departments for many years prior to the renovation.
Therefore, faculty members from that department had detailed information on the desirability of di¤erent o¢ ces. Moreover, before the o¢ ce selections were made, the dean's o¢ ce provided detailed descriptions regarding o¢ ce attributes to all faculty.
The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the characteristics for the available o¢ ces. The o¢ ces are located on the top …ve ‡oors of an eight- ‡oor building. Half of ‡oor 4 and ‡oors 5, 6, 7, and 8 had undergone renovation. 12 Each ‡oor has o¢ ces that face east, west, and south.
There are di¤erences in size, ‡oor, and view of the o¢ ces.
In terms of size, there are three o¢ ce types. The majority of o¢ ces are identically sized (at about 213 square feet). These are the 56 o¢ ces facing either west or east, aligned on the two sides of a main corridor, on ‡oors 5, 6, 7, and 8 (accounting for 76% of all o¢ ces). Then Faculty were told that the preferred views tend to be on the higher ‡oors, and on the sides facing west and south (in high ‡oors, the west and south-exposed o¢ ces have open city views, while the east ones look onto a high-tra¢ c artery).
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In what follows, we consider two alternative measures of proximity between two o¢ ces. In particular, we illustrate the impact of both ‡oor proximity (that is, the two o¢ ces are on the same ‡oor), and neighborhood proximity (the distance between two o¢ ces'doors is less than 30 feet) on outcomes.
14 12 The lower ‡oors and the other half of the 4th ‡oor contained classrooms and were not changed. 13 In fact, faculty members were encouraged to tour the building with its current tenants and examine the rooms regarding these attributes.
14 The 30ft …gure is chosen to include o¢ ces that are less than two doors away on either side of the main corridor. Since there are no o¢ ces directly in front of them, o¢ ces facing south have neighbors only on their
Population characteristics
The bottom two panels of Table 1 contain the summary statistics of our population, and Section 3 provides a detailed description of its characteristics. Faculty members' attributes were collected using two sources:
1. Web-harvested individual data on department, research cluster, arrival at the school, Ph.D. cohort, coauthorship, education background, and gender. 
The Matching Process Data
Our data contain the complete results from the matching process. In particular, besides the …nal assignment of o¢ ces after swaps, for every choice made we know the set of faculty who had already chosen an o¢ ce, how the partial assignment looked at the time of choice, and the remaining faculty who still had to make a choice.
cluster each faculty belongs to, coauthorship links, and friendship links. Below, we describe each of these layers of the network of connections and the correlations between them.
Institutional Network
The …rst network we consider addresses the research interests of faculty members, dividing them according to their speci…c research …elds. The 73 faculty members are divided into 4 departments according to main research …elds. Each department is further divided into di¤erent research clusters according to research sub-…elds, resulting in a total of 15 clusters.
The average department size is 19:6 individuals (ranging from 13 to 26). The average cluster size is 6:3 individuals, ranging from 1 to 9. The research network appears in Figure 1 below.
In the …gure, each node's shape corresponds to a particular research department, where each of the four departments is located in a di¤erent quadrant. Nodes are encircled in a set if they belong to the same research cluster. Since in this network individuals within a cluster (or department) are all connected to one another, each connected component in this network is complete (in particular, the average distance 16 within a connected component is 1).
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Coauthorship Network
The second network encapsulates professional interactions among faculty, as captured by the existence of coauthored work. This network has been built combining web-harvested and survey data. In particular, in this network we consider two faculty connected if they coauthored at least one paper together in the past or are currently collaborating on a project (the latter element declared in survey responses). The coauthorship network is described by the solid lines between nodes (both bold and faint) in Figure 1 .
At the time of choice, the average number of coauthors each faculty member had among other faculty members was 1:56, ranging from 0 to 6. The average distance between connected 16 The distance between two nodes is de…ned as the number of links on the shortest path in the network connecting the two nodes.
17 Moreover, we distinguish the faculty gender in Figure 1 using the shading of nodes (white for female faculty and gray for male faculty). individuals in this network is 3:28, ranging from 1 to 10.
Friendship Network
The friendship network captures the interactions among the 37 faculty members who answered the survey, as well as the individuals socially connected to them (that is, individuals who were not survey respondents themselves, but were declared as a friend by at least one survey respondent).
In detail, Question 6 in the survey asked participants to name up to 5 fellow faculty members with whom they had lunch on a regular basis. Question 8 asked participants to name up to 5 personal friends (people with whom the participant interacts socially with outside school at least once a month) from within the school (see Appendix A). To build a friendship network, we combined the answers to these two questions. Two faculty are connected if they were mentioned one by the other in either Question 6 or 8. In particular, not all faculty included in this network are necessarily survey respondents-they are either survey respondents or individuals connected to a survey respondent, totalling 56 such extended survey respondents who compose the network. Twenty-one faculty members speci…ed at least one individual on either one of these questions. We stress that survey respondents who did not specify colleagues'names answering Questions 6 and 8 could either (i) not have any social interactions with other members of the faculty, or (ii) have social interactions they prefer not to disclose in the survey.
This generates the network given by the dotted and bold line connections in Figure 1 (bold signifying links between nodes that are connected in both the coauthorship and friendship networks). We assume links are bidirectional. Indeed, Questions 6 and 8 were phrased so that individuals were speci…cally asked to report the frequency of interactions (lunches or social events outside the school), that are inherently symmetric.
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As reported in Table 1 , the extended survey respondents are reported to have an average 18 In our data, if we restrict attention to survey respondents alone, the probability that f considers f 0 a friend, conditional on f 0 considering f a friend, is 52%. of 0:89 individuals (ranging from 0 to 4) whom they interact with socially outside the school, and 2 colleagues with whom they regularly have lunch (ranging from 0 to 9). The average degree in the friendship network is 2:39, ranging from 0 to 9, and the average distance of individuals is 4:91, ranging from 1 to 12.
Overlap of Networks
Figure 1 demonstrates the complexity of the social network under examination, and the difference between the coauthor and friendship relations. Table 2 provides the exact correlations between the di¤erent layers of the social network. The correlations below the main diagonal are computed with observations associated with all faculty members. The correlations above the main diagonal are computed restricting the data to survey respondents and faculty members who are connected to them (in the friendship network). As clusters are subsets of departments, the two networks are highly correlated. However, the other network layers are not highly correlated with one another, and, notably, friendship ties seem fairly uncorrelated with department, cluster and, to some degree, coauthorship links. 
Existence of Network E¤ects in O¢ ce Selection
The choice made by each faculty member during the matching process could be in ‡uenced both by the o¢ ce's physical attributes ( ‡oor, size, exposure), as well as the choices made (or 19 The research network is rather di¤erent from the friendship and coauthorship networks in that links are arguably institutionally speci…ed (whereas friendships and coauthorships are ‡exible individual choices).
expected to be made) by others. Figure 2 describes the outcome of the matching process (after ex-post trades took place) with dotted lines representing links within a ‡oor in the friendship network, faint solid lines the coauthorship network, and bold solid lines the intersection of both networks. In particular, the …gure represents the …nal spatial assignment by ‡oor, with the shape of the nodes corresponding to di¤erent departments. Figure 2 is partially suggestive of the role department a¢ liation, coauthorship, and friendship may have played during the assignment process.
We start our investigation by assessing the null hypothesis that network externalities are not taken into consideration during o¢ ce selection. As a …rst take, we consider the discrete choice each faculty is facing. Each observation in our sample corresponds to a pair (f; o); where f is a faculty member and o is an o¢ ce available to this faculty member at her time of choice.
We specify an array of models in which choices are explained by variables that correspond to both physical and network characteristics. Such an approach is inherently non-strategic in that we do not take into account forward-looking strategic aspects that are potentially present if network e¤ects are at play (in particular, the approach does not allow us to quantify the e¤ects of externalities). However, note that if the null hypothesis that network externalities were irrelevant to choice holds, any coe¢ cient pertaining to network variables should not be signi…cantly di¤erent from 0: Large Corner O¢ ce, Western Exposure, and Highest Available (which are the corresponding dummy variables, that is, they take the value 1 if the o¢ ce under consideration is a large corner o¢ ce, has western exposure, and is on the highest ‡oor available at the time of choice, respectively, and 0 otherwise).
In the …rst speci…cation, denoted CL(i), we include only the physical attributes of o¢ ces. 20 Note that the set of available o¢ ces decreases by one unit after each choice is made. Thus, a faculty at position k = 1; ::; N in the ranking has N k + 1 possible o¢ ces to choose from. Each observation in our data corresponds to a faculty and their menu of o¢ ces (excluding the last faculty who was left with no choice): Thus, for our 73 faculty, we have a total of Western exposure and high ‡oor seem to have signi…cantly a¤ected faculty's choices. In the following speci…cations, denoted CL(ii)-CL(iv), we introduce variables associated with the department, coauthorship, and friendship networks. The results of these speci…cations provide two main insights. First, network variables'
21 Speci…cations CL(ii-iv) were chosen to correspond to our ensuing speci…cations in Section 5. 22 Recall that in Section 2.2.1 we de…ned two o¢ ces as neighbors if the distance between o¢ ce doors is less than 30 feet. 23 The last speci…cation, CL(iv), is restricted to faculty who have links in our social network and as such pertains to fewer observations. coe¢ cients are positive and at the micro-neighborhood level signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at any reasonable con…dence level. 24, 25 In particular, we reject the null hypothesis that network externalities (at all three levels) did not in ‡uence faculty's o¢ ce choices. Second, the regressions suggest the importance of accounting for network e¤ects when estimating such matching processes. Indeed, the coe¢ cients corresponding to o¢ ces'physical attributes change significantly when we include network variables. Note that these coe¢ cients respond in di¤erent ways to the omission of network variables: the e¤ects of large corner o¢ ces are underestimated in CL(i) relative to CL(iii) since faculty choose o¢ ces close to colleagues when large ones are available; the e¤ects of highest ‡oor are overestimated in CL(i) relative to CL(iii); suggesting that faculty may be choosing higher ‡oors to be in proximity to particular colleagues, rather than out of a preference for higher ‡oors per se. 
A Dartboard Approach to Estimating Network Effects
The exploratory regressions discussed in Section 3 suggest the existence of non-trivial e¤ects of network externalities on match outcomes. In order to assess the magnitude of these e¤ects, we start by considering counterfactual assignment procedures that do not account for any observable externalities and compare the degree to which such procedures generate network proximity relative to that observed in our data. Put di¤erently, we assess to what extent a random assignment based on purely physical o¢ ce attributes can explain the observed patterns of social connection, accounting for the mechanism in place (namely, the order in which faculty chose o¢ ces).
We consider three types of procedures that di¤er in the prevailing faculty preferences for o¢ ces. For simplicity, we analyze lexicographic preferences that allow faculty to value certain physical attributes over others. In our …rst speci…cation, denoted (I), we make all o¢ ces equivalent. In speci…cation (II), we assume that each faculty has a lexicographic preference in which large corner o¢ ces precede western-exposure o¢ ces. In the third speci…cation, denoted (III), we suppose faculty have lexicographic preferences such that higher ‡oor precedes large corner o¢ ces, which precede western-exposure o¢ ces.
These speci…cations are consistent with survey results. Indeed, in Question 11 in the survey, 86% of respondents declared the top ‡oors, ‡oors 6-8, as their most preferred, and 83% declared the bottom ‡oors, ‡oors 4-5, as their least preferred. 27 In response to questions asking about the importance of o¢ ce ‡oor, size, and exposure (on a scale of 1-10), there
were no signi…cant di¤erences in responses, though the distribution of responses of o¢ ce ‡oor did stochastically dominate those corresponding to size and exposure, suggesting that our counterfactual (III) may be of more relevance. Nonetheless, speci…cations (I) and (II) allow for greater freedom in the assignment process and therefore, in principle, make the observed assignment easier to achieve.
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Under both speci…cations, upon indi¤erence, agents randomize among their top o¢ ces.
For each of the two speci…cations, we used the order by which faculty chose to simulate the random-matching procedure 100; 000 times.
For every set of simulations, we considered the three network layers: institutional a¢ liation (captured through department), coauthorship, and friendship (encapsulating the connections determined through social interaction or lunch companionship as described in Section 2). We calculated the resulting average volume of faculty from each network in a participating faculty's macro-neighborhood (the ‡oor of their o¢ ce), and their micro-neighborhood (the set of close o¢ ce neighbors), which are reported in Table 4 . For example, the number of neighboring 27 The assumption that faculty prefer larger o¢ ces to smaller ones and o¢ ces with city views to large road views seem natural …rst steps.
28 Permuting the order of o¢ ce characteristics that enter the lexicographic preferences does not alter results signi…cantly.
faculty members who share a department a¢ liation is 89 in our data, but approximately 63 in each of our three speci…cations.
In fact, Table 4 illustrates how, across the network layers, simulated faculty numbers are consistently lower than those observed in the data. Floor-level proximity is lower by at least 16% for members of the same department and friends, and by at least 27% for coauthors.
At the neighborhood level our results are more striking, with proximity of o¢ ce neighbors under the coauthor and friendship layers lower than the observed number by at least 40%.
Department level sorting was lower by approximately 30%. The di¤erences between simulated sorting and that observed were signi…cant at any reasonable con…dence level, with the probability of reaching or exceeding the observed levels of clustering in our simulations never surpassing 1% at the ‡oor level, and 0:2% at the neighborhood level. We therefore conclude that the order in which faculty chose their o¢ ces does not seem, in itself, to explain a big fraction of the network huddling that occurred during the matching process.
While highlighting the e¤ect of network externalities as a whole, this approach does not allow us to disentangle the di¤erential e¤ect from each of the di¤erent networks on agents' choices for two reasons: First, since the di¤erent layers of social networks are correlated, crosslayer comparisons of the dartboard approach results cannot be directly associated to agents' utility. Second, because of the strategic nature of the matching process, signi…cant di¤erences in how agents perceive the di¤erent layers of the social networks may result in small di¤erences in the counter-factual estimates, and vice-versa.
Estimating the Relative E¤ects of Di¤erent Networks
The previous two sections motivated the importance of networks to the o¢ ce selection mechanism. In particular, Section 3 made the case that externalities matter, while the dartboard approach presented in Section 4 allowed us to quantify the extent to which network externalities a¤ected the …nal assignment, but without the ability to separate the e¤ects of the di¤erent network layers. In this section, we seek to disentangle the relative importance of each of the Speci…cation (I) …lls randomly; speci…cation (II) …lls by large corner o¢ ces …rst and then western exposure; speci…cation (III) …lls by corner o¢ ce, western exposure and ‡oor from the top.F(x x ) gives the empirical probability of being equal to or greater than the observed value. Each procedure was simulated 100,000 times. three layers on o¢ ce choice: the department a¢ liation, the coauthorship network, and the friendship network. In particular, we are interested in separating the e¤ects of the institutional network generated by membership in a department from the ones of the spontaneous networks based on coauthorship and friendship.
In principle, the mechanism instated for allocating o¢ ces de…nes an extensive-form game.
One empirical strategy allowing to quantify the relative e¤ects of network connections and physical characteristics of o¢ ces entails the assumption that faculty's assignments are irreversible and that they are in equilibrium. 29 That is, assume that agents' preferences take some functional form, allowing for the weight placed on network and physical characteristics of o¢ ces to be parametrized. Then, for any parameter value, there would be a corresponding set of equilibria of the assignment mechanism. In principle, this approach would allow us to select the parameters that best match our data. Note, however, that strategies in this game are contingent plans that specify, for each agent, a choice to be made after any conceivable selections by their predecessors. Since our data set contains 72 faculty who have a non-trivial choice, the set of strategies is vast and …nding parametric equilibria pro…les is not computationally feasible.
In order to overcome this computational di¢ culty and still exploit the strategic elements inherent in the matching process, we focus on natural restrictions on the emergent assignment.
Namely, recall that faculty members were allowed to swap o¢ ces after the draft was completed, and that monetary transfers across research accounts were allowed to facilitate such swaps.
In what follows, we assume that the transfers were not subject to budget contraints. Indeed, faculty were allowed to borrow against future years' research budget allocations. It follows that once the assignment has been determined (after all ex-post o¢ ce swaps), we can assume that there are no remaining bene…cial swaps, that is, the assignment is stable. Furthermore, we use the fact that faculty could make monetary transfers to assume transferable utility. In the spirit of Bajari and Fox (2009) , and Fox (2009), we add structure to faculty's preferences and require that no two faculty would bene…t from exchanging o¢ ces (accounting for network e¤ects derived from such an exchange) regardless of the monetary transfers between them.
This requirement provides us with a manageable set of restrictions that allows for preference estimation.
Stability with Externalities
Consider a …nite set of faculty F and a …nite set of o¢ ces O. We ultimately observe an assignment : F ! O, a bijection assigning each faculty member to a particular o¢ ce. The utility of faculty member f can be generically represented by the utility function u f ( ). 30 For any assignment ; we denote by f 0 f the assignment derived from by exchanging the o¢ ce assignments of f and f 0 :
The notion of stability (with transfers) we use requires that for any faculty pair (f; f 0 ) there does not exist a transfer t from f to f 0 such that the bilateral exchange of o¢ ces speci…ed by improves both their outcomes. That is,
and at least one of these inequalities is strict. Or, equivalently:
De…nition 1 (Pairwise Stability). An assignment is pairwise stable if for every pair
30 Unlike matching settings without externalities, in which an agent's utility depends solely on their own match, externalities imply that utilities may depend on the entire assignment. Note that the set of feasible assignments has cardinality jFj! < 1, so a utility representation for each agent over all assignemnts is well de…ned.
We remain agnostic as to the exact nature of any bargaining or distribution of any pairwise surplus from a switch, but maintain the condition that should a pairwise reassignment be improving, that it be carried out.
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Two comments regarding the assumptions underlying this de…nition are necessary. First, for technical tractability, our stability notion essentially assumes that faculty have myopic or boundedly rational beliefs over the process that ensues following a deviation. Indeed, in the presence of externalities, a switch by any pair of faculty a¤ects others uninvolved in the swap.
In general, one could contemplate beliefs specifying the reactions of all participants to such a deviation (in which case even existence can be problematic to obtain, see Sasaki and Toda, 1996 and Hafalir, 2008) . Second, our notion considers only bilateral swaps, rather than larger groups'exchanges. We choose to focus on pairwise stability for simplicity and to match the behaviorally founded idea that it would be harder for larger coalitions to solve this assignment problem within their coalition.
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Pairwise stability generates (jF j 1) jF j 2 necessary inequalities. In our data, one faculty moved to a di¤erent building after the initial assignment. Therefore, with 72 faculty left after the post-draft moves, we generate 2556 inequalities. We will assume that u f ( ) takes the form:
where P o represents the physical desirability of o¢ ce o (its view, size, exposure, etc.) and R(f ; ) is a vector of network e¤ects speci…c to f induced by the assignment (proximity to coauthors, friends, departmental colleagues, etc.). In fact, throughout our analysis, we will assume that R(f ; ) depends (linearly) on the number of faculty from each network under consideration that end up on their ‡oor or in their immediate neighborhood. That is, for any 31 It is useful to contrast the notion of stability we use, exchange of an assigned object between two faculty f and f 0 , and the blocking-pair notion of stability in the two-sided matching, where a faculty-o¢ ce pair (f; o)
would block an assignment. Due to a lack of agency or preference on the side of the o¢ ces, the blocking coalition is of the same size, two agents, but on one side of the market. 32 Indeed, of the observed switches after the assignment process, the …rst involved a pair of faculty exchanging their o¢ ces, and the second involved a triple, where one of the three moved to an o¢ ce outside of the building, and the other two organized a switch over the three o¢ ces (their own two and the one freed up by the move). So the maximal size of the switching groups was in fact two. faculty f; let k(f; ; l) be the number of faculty from network layer l; l = 1; :::; L (research, coauthorship, or friendship) that are in f 's neighborhood (say, ‡oor) under the assignment :
This formulation allows for the volume of peers in someone's proximity to a¤ect their wellbeing. For simplicity, we assume that the volume of faculty members unconnected to the individual have no e¤ect on well-being at either of the proximity levels. This formulation is general in that: (i) Networks could be thought of as bilateral, with each pair of agents constituting a particular layer l, so it is additive separability, not linearity, that places the main constraint on utilities' functional form. (ii) The coe¢ cients f l g are not restricted in sign so that peer e¤ects can be either positive or negative.
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Proposition 1, whose proof is given in Appendix B, shows that the market structure we impose allows for the existence of pairwise-stable assignments.
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Proposition 1 (Existence). There exists a pairwise-stable assignment.
We now add a stochastic term to represent an idiosyncratic component for faculty f 's preferences for a match so that preferences are represented by:
where is the match-speci…c unobserved idiosyncratic error. Given this speci…cation, consider the pairwise stability-condition corresponding to two faculty members. The physical attractiveness of the o¢ ce essentially serves as a …xed e¤ect when contemplating a swap, which can be directly compensated for with a transfer. Consequently, pairwise-stability constraints put 33 In particular, a layer must be symmetric: should faculty member f value the proximity of f 0 at x utiles, then it must be the case that f 0 values the proximity of f at x too. This symmetry rules out cycles where one faculty member desires close proximity to another who desires distance, and is key to the existence result in Proposition 1. 34 We note that existence of stable assignments in the presence of externalities has been a major hurdle in the theoretical literature on the topic. Our existence result suggests that in environments such as those we study, stability is a managable concept. restrictions only on the network components of faculty's utility. Formally, pairwise stability of a match translates into the following. For any two faculty f; f 0 ; noting that (f ) =
The inequalities captured in (2) allow us to estimate the underlying parameter vector .
Implementation
The set of inequalities de…ned by (2) serve as the basis for maximizing a score function (see Manski, 1975) de…ned as:
Three remarks about this objective function are in order. First, note that the satisfaction of each inequality in (3) is de…ned in terms of strong inequalities. While inconsequential for the estimated parameters themselves, this allows us to get slightly more meaningful optimal score values. Indeed, in many cases our network measures are sparse, that is, two faculty are not likely to be connected across a particular measure. When individuals are not connected, the corresponding summand in (3) would always be satis…ed if the inequality were weak. In particular, the values of the score would be shifted up by the number of faculty pairs who are not connected in any of the network layers relevant for the speci…cation.
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Second, we use this objective rather than a smoothed version a-là Horowitz (1992) for simplicity and freedom from the need to choose tuning parameters for smoothing. This comes at the natural cost of the objective being discontinuous and not amenable to di¤erential methods of optimization.
35 Estimations were performed using Mathematica's di¤erential evolution algorithm, which has good properties when used to …nd global extrema of optimization problems (see Fox, 2009 and Santiago and Fox, 2008) . 36 We stress that, since our scores are lower than the ones obtained with a weak inequality version of (3), there is a di¤erence in magnitude between our scores and the ones found in the literature that employs maximum scores with weak inequalities (see, for instance, Bajari and Fox, 2009 The column headed = 1 ( = 1) corresponds to a positive (negative) normalization for variable. The scores correspond to number of inequalities predicted with objective (3).
Finally, the value of the score is invariant to scaling of the parameter (that is, for any a > 0; Q(a ) = Q( )). Identi…cation therefore requires a normalization for one of the coe¢ -cients, which must have a non-zero contribution to preferences. As previously demonstrated through our discrete-choice estimations (see Table 3 ) and illustrated in Figure 2 , locating near department colleagues plays an important role in location choice. In addition, since the average degree corresponding to the departmental a¢ liation network is high (relative to the other network layers we consider), many of the inequalities in (3) have non-trivial elements pertaining to departmental network e¤ects. We therefore normalize the coe¢ cient for the proximity of a departmental neighbor to 1, denominating the remaining variables in terms of foregone departmental neighbors. In order to further justify this normalization Table 5 provides the score Q when accounting for only one layer of the network. Since the magnitudes of the relevant coe¢ cient cannot be calibrated, we look at the scores for = 1 and = 1: Table 5 reports the score Q for both the entire data set and the subset of observations corresponding to participants of the friendship network. The department variables are consistently the ones generating the highest score levels, thereby explaining most of the restrictions.
37
37 Note that, as stressed above, we would have obtained higher scores using a weak inequality version of (3). In particular, the only inequalities that we would not have been able to predict are the ones explained by a negative coe¢ cient ( = 1) when inequalities are strict. For instance, Department Neighbors would have predicted 2208=2556-348 with a positive normalization.
Results
Holding constant the department-neighbor normalization discussed above, we now estimate the intensities of each network layer relative to Department Neighbors. Our results are given in Table 6 . Coe¢ cients are reported as an identi…ed interval i ; i for the speci…c variable i, where i is the minimal coe¢ cient that maximizes the objective (3), and i is the maximal coe¢ cient. 38 That is:
This approach is required by the lack of point identi…cation for , that we discuss below, caused by two factors: (i) a discontinuous objective; and (ii) integer measures for our network layers.
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The …rst column in Table 6 , titled PS(i), gauges the relative importance of the micro and macro neighborhoods for department members. Department Floor is a count of the number of department colleagues currently located on the same ‡oor for the particular faculty-o¢ ce pair under consideration. As such, the ‡oor variable can only aid in explaining ‡oor choice, since the di¤erence in ‡oor counts under an intra- ‡oor exchange is zero for both faculty members involved in the swap. The speci…cation produces no signi…cant e¤ect for ‡oor organization.
However, even though the ‡oor coe¢ cient is small in size, the negative sign still explains approximately 500 inequalities over the single variable Department Neighbors. The negative sign could be interpreted as a decreasing-returns e¤ect to Department Neighbors with which it is (unsurprisingly) correlated. Given the small estimated size of the coe¢ cient, and the insigni…cance of the e¤ect, we conclude that local proximity is much more important than 38 Similarly, con…dence intervals reported in Table 6 are constructed using the minimal coe¢ cients for the lower limits and the maximal coe¢ cients for the upper limit, a particularly conservative approach to …nding the 95% con…dence interval.
39 Note that when the speci…cation entails more than one coe¢ cient in addition to the normalized one, and need not maximize the objective. In particular, focusing on a set of coe¢ cients with minimal absolute values provides a conservative assessment of the e¤ect of the corresponding variables. 95% con…dence interval in parentheses, derived from bootstrap B = 1; 000, where the upper and lower limit correspond to the 2:5% and 97:5% percentiles of the minimal and maximal coe¢ cient values. The …rst variable's coe¢ cient in each column, 1 , is normalized to magnitude 1 for scale identi…cation. Score in parentheses is the number of inequalities predicted with a weak inequality version of (3). ‡oor proximity.
In PS(ii), we evaluate the importance of the coauthorship network relative to the department network. 40 The …rst point to note from PS(ii) is the large and signi…cantly positive e¤ect coming from Coauthor Neighbors. In particular, looking at the assessed interval we …nd that having a single coauthor nearby is enough, ceteris paribus, to compensate for four to …ve department colleagues in neighboring o¢ ces. The constructed inference region for this coe¢ cient is large, and is arbitrarily close to 1-however, we point out that this con…dence interval is a conservative estimate of the true 95% con…dence interval.
It is worth noting here that the score in PS(ii) is substantially lower than in PS(i), with the same number of explanatory variables when focusing on strict inequalities (this conclusion is reversed when looking at the weak inequality version of the objective in (3)). This is due to the larger number of degenerate inequalities generated by PS(ii). Restricting the calculation 40 Speci…cations including ‡oor-level variables for both coauthors and friendships found results similar to PS(i). While the inclusion increases the score slightly, the magnitude and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients remain similar. This leads us to believe that ‡oor-level variables do not have powerful explanatory value. Similarly, the inclusion of variables related to research clusters do not add explanatory power to the speci…cations PS(ii)-PS(iii).
to inequalities with non-trivial content-that is, those swaps that can be positively explained by a vector -leads to similar explanatory power for the two speci…cations: PS(i) predicts 82:2% of them correctly, against 81:6% for PS(ii).
Finally, we introduce data from the friendship network in PS(iii). In this speci…cation we only include those inequalities corresponding to swaps between the 56 members of the extended-survey network.
41 Consequently, the sample size decreases by approximately 40%.
In our previous empirical approaches, in Sections 3 and 4, the friendship and coauthorship networks appear to have a comparable impact on the …nal outcome. Speci…cally, inspection of Table 4 points to a similar level of additional sorting in each network, and the coe¢ cients in Table 3 represent similar e¤ects from each on the probability of choosing a particular o¢ ce.
Surprisingly, however, we …nd that the friendship network does not have a strong e¤ect on o¢ ce choice with respect to the other network layers. This result is due to an important di¤erence between this approach and the previous techniques: indeed, the stability estimation incorporates the information derived from the lack of ex-post swaps that could have produced greater proximity among friends. Finally, note that of those pairs with a non-trivial inequality, PS(iii) predicts 85:7% of the inequalities correctly.
In order to measure the tradeo¤s between the addition of variables and the number of inequalities explained we construct the following criterion. If regressors were i.i.d. random variables (with median 0) uncorrelated with outcomes, a single regressor would explain approximately one half of the non-trivial inequalities in a large sample. The addition of another independent regressor would explain half of the remaining inequalities, and so on. Thus, with two regressors our baseline is 75% of non-trivial inequalities explained, with three, 87:5%, etc. 42 Given the positive correlation between our network measures, this is a harsh criterion for evaluating the predictive power of an additional regressor. Both PS(i) and PS(ii) 41 However, the vector of characteristics for each of the remaining faculty are calculated using data on the entire population. For example, a faculty member outside of the extended-survey sample will still be counted as a coauthor/colleague neighbor when considering the observed assignment or a prospective swap. 42 Note that this rule does not specify anything about the intensity of the coe¢ cients derived, just that a signed variable can explain this many of the remaining inequalities. exceed this level of sorting but PS(iii) is slightly below the 87:5% threshold. We view the failure to meet this threshold as further evidence for the under-organization contributed by the friendship network when both department and coauthor networks are controlled for.
Two …nal notes are in order regarding the econometric techniques used. First, we utilize the bootstrap method in order to derive the con…dence regions illustrated in this section. Subbotin (2008) provides asymptotic arguments for bootstrap inference over the class of algorithms containing the maximum-correlation estimator. One of the operating assumptions for this result is continuity of the independent variables. Our environment does not meet this particular requirement because of the binary nature of both the network relations and the physical proximity measure for o¢ ces. However, with …nite samples, we believe the usefulness of the bootstrap method is in testing the sensitivity of the estimated coe¢ cients to the over-and under-sampling of speci…c inequalities within the data, while its freedom from any tuning parameter is an additional bene…t.
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A further problem relates to the asymptotic identi…cation assumptions required for this estimation method. The assumptions in Bajari and Fox (2009) require that, given enough data, for any parameter vector di¤erent from the true one, more inequalities would be violated. In a setting in which all of the underlying explanatory variables are related to social-network degree, one may expect problems since: (i) network degrees (and, in fact, many other network characteristics) are discrete by nature; and (ii) it is unlikely that individuals have unboundedly many social connections, even as we consider bigger and bigger samples, so the support is bounded. Point identi…cation is therefore inherently problematic. It is for this reason that we focus on estimating the interval of coe¢ cients that maximize our objective function. This is well-de…ned, computationally feasible, and pessimistic in terms of coe¢ cients'signi…cance. 43 An alternate approach would be subsampling, as outlined in Politis and Romano (1994) , with the tradeo¤ being the necessity of specifying a subsample size parameter. In a strong form-using all the inequalities generated between random samples of 42 faculty members, a number chosen so as to produce roughly 1=3 the number of inequalities as the full sample of 72-subsampling generates similar though less signi…cant results. For instance, for the variable Coauthor Neighbors in PS(ii), the lower bound of the con…dence interval (corresponding to i ) is 0 at the 2:5% level and 0:5 at the 5% level. The upper bound of i is similar to that found with the bootstrap inference at the 97:5% level.
From a methodological point of view, we stress that econometric theory is still in ‡ux with respect to set identi…cation and our analysis is based on techniques engineered for similar environments.
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6 Welfare
Having established the importance of network externalities in individual preferences, a natural next step is identifying the socially optimal assignment. In this section, we illustrate techniques for doing so.
The analysis in the previous section allowed us to identify the network layers and the proximity notion that impact individuals' utilities the most. We identify a pairwise-stable assignment that, under the estimated preferences, would increase overall e¢ ciency relative to the one instated and, thus, we provide a lower bound on the welfare loss generated by the observed assignment.
Given the utility speci…cation introduced in the previous section, an e¢ cient assignment must satisfy (using our previous notation)
where is the set of all possible assignments, and the second equality follows from the fact that the utility derived from o¢ ces'physical characteristics is homogeneous across agents.
In light of the results of the preference estimation in Section 5, we now assume that the only links that matter to agents are those between departmental colleagues and coauthors in local neighborhoods. Following the results of speci…cation PS(ii), we let the relative coe¢ cient for coauthor with respect to department vary between 1 and 5, the estimated con…dence interval.
Even with these simplifying assumptions, the problem of …nding the most e¢ cient assignment is still not trivial: there are j j = 73! > 10 105 possible assignments and the problem is inherently combinatorial, so di¤erential techniques cannot be employed. 45 The problem …ts into the class of Quadratic Assignments Problems (QAP henceforth), …rst described in Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) the row and column restrictions guarantee a single assignment for each faculty member, and one faculty member to each o¢ ce. Let be the set of assignment matrices:
with the N 1 vector of ones. The problem of …nding the most e¢ cient assignment can therefore be speci…ed in the Koopmans-Beckmann formulation as:
for all f; o 2 f1; ::; N g; x f o 2 f0; 1g ;
where the constraints simply assure that X is an assignment matrix, that is X 2 .
As detailed in Çela (1998), the formulation above can be respeci…ed as follows:
Problem 1 (Quadratic Assignment Problem). Find the matrix X 2 that maximizes tr BXHX T , where tr f g is the trace operator.
48 45 We note that the subtlety of the network architectures make this a more intricate problem than others pertaining to e¢ cient design in the presence of complementarities, such as, say, FCC spectrum allocations. 46 Note that this formulation takes bilateral links as the de-facto networks. The values appearing in the matrix B essentially identify the coe¢ cients f l g in our utility speci…cation, the utility ‡ows between members in the (bilateral) network. 47 The generalized formulation of QAP allows for the arbitrary term c ijlm in place of b ij h lm : 48 Note that the matrix Z = BXHX T has generic element
The QAP problem has been shown to be NP-hard; in fact, even the problem of …nding an "-approximation is computationally complex. 49 Full solutions to this class are still considered numerically intractable for N > 30. Thus, we begin our welfare analysis by specifying a slack upper bound for the problem using the properties of the trace and the eigenvalues of B and H. Given the ordered eigenvalues of H and B-( 1 N ) and ( 1 N ), respectively-we can give a simple upper bound on welfare since we have
for any X 2 :
50 We build the matrix B from the relevant network structures (with preference weights derived from our pairwise-stability estimates as discussed above), and the matrix H from the o¢ ce building's layout, considering two o¢ ces neighbors consistently with the neighborhood de…nition speci…ed in our previous analysis. We …nd that as the weight given to a coauthor neighbor (relative to a departmental neighbor) varies from 1 to 5, the upper bound de…ned in (4) exhibits a gain of 278% to 466% over the observed assignment's e¢ ciency.
Next, we assess a lower bound for the potential e¢ ciency gain. We do so by identifying an alternative pairwise-stable assignment using an ant-colony algorithm (see Dorigo, 1992 and Dorigo, Di Caro, and Gambardella, 1999) , which has been demonstrated to be e¤ective in …nding global optima within the QAP. 51 This algorithm, which is similar in many ways to simulated annealing, imitates the way ants lay pheromone trails when …nding food, guiding the colony as a whole to food sources. The probability of an ant locating a faculty member in a particular o¢ ce is determined by the pheromone levels for that assignment-that is, the Thus, using the symmetry of H and changing summation orders, the trace is equal to
, so the objectives in the two formulations are identical. In fact, the equivalence with Problem 1 is more generally true (see references in Çela, 1998) . 49 The proof that the problem is NP-Hard can be seen by reinterpreting the locations as a time sequence of visits to di¤ering cities, with b ij representing the distance between a city pair, and h lm assuming value 1 if l and m are sequential time-periods. This reinterpretation gives the fairly well-known NP-hard Travelling Salesman's Problem. The complexity of the approximation is demonstrated in Sahni and Gonzalez (1976) . They show that if the "-approximation can be found in polynomial time, then P = N P . 50 For a proof of the inequality in (4), see Hadley, Rendl, and Wolkowicz (1992) . 51 The e¢ ciency gain we identify represents a lower bound on the potential e¢ ciency gain only because, as is common in this literature, the most e¢ cient assignment we identify represents a local maximum, but we are unable to tell whether it is also a global one. number of times other ants have placed the faculty member in this location weighted by the global outcome from the other ants'assignments. We use a colony of 20 ants, and simulate the process for 50 periods, combining at every point the probabilistic location through the ants with direct local-search methods.
Recall that the coe¢ cient corresponding to coauthorship links with respect to departmental ones was estimated between 1 and 5;with a midpoint of 3. Figure 3 illustrates the most e¢ cient assignment found by the algorithm when coauthorship is valued 3 times as much as departmental a¢ liation. 52 The comparison with the observed assignment in Figure 2 suggests the potential for more network clustering in this matching process. In fact, given an equal e¤ect of coauthor and departmental links, the algorithm …nds a lower bound on the potential e¢ ciency gain of 181%. When coauthor links have …ve times the impact of departmental links, this lower bound is evaluated at 213%.
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Given these results, we conclude that the equilibrium selected by the mechanism in place appears ine¢ cient. However, we stress that the limitations of our data set forced us to assume homogeneous preferences across faculty. The e¢ ciency of the observed assignment could in principle improve with respect to our estimates if we allowed di¤erent individuals to put di¤erent weights on network externalities (e.g., if faculty members that care less about externalities tend to be more senior, they may sort themselves toward better o¢ ces at the cost of less network links, allowing others to generate more high-e¢ ciency links among themselves).
Nonetheless, in light of the signi…cant distance between the welfare performance of the observed assignment and the simulated one, one needs to conjecture a dramatic heterogeneity in preferences in order to commend the performance of the procedure in place.
The pragmatic message of this section is that ex-ante knowledge of the underlying network architecture appears to be crucial in generating a high e¢ ciency match. Furthermore, computational methods from the QAP literature may be useful for identifying e¢ cient assignments. 52 The most e¢ cient assignment is not unique. Indeed, notice that ‡oors 5 and 7 are interchangeable as are ‡oors 6 and 8. 53 We note that despite friendships not appearing in the utility speci…cation here, the number of friendship links in local neighborhoods improves from 18 in the observed assignment to 29 in the simulated one. 
Conclusion
We document a unique assignment protocol of faculty to o¢ ces in which locations (o¢ ces) varied in physical characteristics. We elicited three layers of network connections: institutional and choice-based (coauthorship and friendship). Our data allow us to study the role of network externalities.
Three main insights stand out. First, network externalities have a crucial impact on behavior and …nal outcomes in the assignment process. Second, the di¤erent network layers have unequal impacts on outcomes. Third, from a normative perspective, identifying the relevant networks is important for the design of e¢ cient assignments.
From a methodological point of view, our study suggests the usefulness of a modi…ed notion of stability for the estimation of network externalities in assignment processes. The paper also contributes to the empirical literature regarding social networks. Namely, we show how to account for the relative impact of di¤erent layers of peer connections. We also point out techniques that can be employed to evaluate the welfare performance of assignments in the presence of externalities.
Ultimately, this paper highlights the conceptual signi…cance and empirical feasibility of considering network externalities in matching setups. Research Cluster 1 (8 .5 7 % ) 2 (2 .8 6 % ) 3 (1 4 .2 9 % ) 4 (2 .8 6 % ) 5 (8 .5 7 % ) 6 (2 .8 6 % ) 7 (8 .5 7 % ) 8 (1 7 .1 4 % ) 9 (1 7 .1 4 % ) 1 0 (1 7 .1 4 % )
16. At the time of your selection, how likely did you think you were to switch o¢ ces (where 1 corresponds to no switch and 10 corresponds to sure switch)? (12.12%) 21. We would appreciate it greatly if you could describe to us how you would made your decision of o¢ ce in the space below.
22. Suppose that an additional o¢ ce were made available and auctioned o¤ in the business school. Please specify your 3 top choices for the location of that o¢ ce (in terms of ‡oor -4 through 8 and exposure -east, west, or south) and the maximal bid you would be willing to pay out of your research account in order to move from your current allocated o¢ ce to the new available one. Thus, if you specify an amount X for any particular o¢ ce, and all other bids fall below that, you would move to that o¢ ce and pay X out of your research account. If any other bid surpasses X, you would stay in your current o¢ ce. If several other colleagues would specify precisely the same X, we would randomly select one of you and exchange their o¢ ce for X out of their research account.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
Since the number of possible assignments is …nite, there exists a most e¢ cient one. Let be the most utilitarian e¢ cient assignment. We now show that is pairwise stable. Indeed, suppose that faculty f and f 0 form a blocking pair. That is, there exists some transfer t such that:
l k(f; ; l);
and at least one of inequalities is strict. Since 
Note that is a¤ected through network layers that encompass di¤erent numbers of faculty on each location following the switch. That is, suppose that under ; in o¢ ce (f ); faculty f has k 1 ; :::k L connected faculty from layers 1; :::; L (including themselves), and, in o¢ ce (f 0 ), faculty f has r 1 ; :::; r L faculty from layers 1; :::; L. Then a shift to o¢ ce (f 0 ) would correspond to an increase by 1 of all the relevant networks: r 1 + 1; :::; r L + 1. This would render o¢ ce 
